We live chained down by oughts. We see morality as what we ought to do, as the price we must pay for the reward of living in this world. We live as if we must do the right thing, because it is the right thing to do. Because otherwise we would be breaking the contract of existence. We would be sinners, sentenced to live and die with the knowledge that we are guilty of not holding up our end of the cosmic bargain to exist in order to do the right thing, to follow the rules handed down by god or ethicists or your own conscience. I write today to say that this is wrong. You owe nothing to existence, to the world, to your society, or to your family. You may live oughtlessly, free of chains.
Why do you exist? Why do you live? Some might answer that it is for some higher purpose, some meaning yet to be known. I have said before that we live for life, duty bound to propagate it as best we can. These are flawed explanations. You exist for nothing. There is nothing one must live for, do, believe, or think. Let me explain why. First, you did not choose existence. Existence cannot be seen as a contract because there was never a bargain. No reasonable argument can be made for coming into the world in debt, as a sinner who must repent for past or future sins. Existence was not earned, payed for, or even granted to you, for you did not exist to earn, pay for, or be granted existence. These claims simply cannot be made. So we do not owe the world for existence.
But don’t we owe the system that created us? Don’t we owe our parents for bringing us into this world, and those who have supported us for putting us in the position we are today? Shouldn’t we be thankful to our creator, whoever or whatever you identify in this role? No. We owe our creator nothing. When an engineer crafts a tool, they are responsible for its existence, the tool cannot owe thanks to the engineer. It wasn’t blessed with creation, because as I’ve said, it didn’t exist to be blessed. Further, however, the tool doesn’t owe it to its creator to function in some desired way. It simply functions. If the creator wishes for a certain functionality, they may try to build it in or else control it externally after it is created. But the tool cannot owe its creator whatever functionality is wished for. That is ridiculous. Creators are responsible for their creation. So if society created you, it is responsible for you and your actions, you do not owe society your compliance. This holds true for your parents, gods, and the government. These entities may be responsible for you, but they are not owed debts or even thanks. Having existential domain over an object does not imply that the object must do anything for you. The same holds for you and your creator. Even to those who have given to you since your creation, you may feel a debt, and you may repay them, but this is not required by the world. The outside world simply doesn’t have a say in these transactions. You may make a contract with a person, but you never make a contract with the world, the cosmos, or the gods. There is no overriding “ought” dictating how you must live your life, due to existential debts or worldly ones. No matter the cause, nothing can claim to dictate your actions in the overriding sense that morals and guilt often try to hold. There is nothing you must to do.
There is a more semantic argument for this conclusion. Since free will is deterministic, the world cannot demand anything from you but what you actually do. You cannot do what you will not do, deterministically. So it is foolish to demand anything else from people. No one but you has control over yourself, your actions, or your thoughts. Therefore no one has claim over you, your actions, or your thoughts. No one can demand that you do as they say is necessary, because truly necessary things will happen, and that which doesn’t wasn’t necessary. Yes, you have control over yourself—that is the wonder of existence—but no one has a reasonable claim over how you use that control, whether or not anyone perceives it as good or bad. You will only do what you will that you will do. So there is nothing you ought to do.
But what if there’s some higher meaning? First, I would love to see a convincing argument that there is a “higher” meaning. Finding meaning in life is incredibly rewarding, and a source of meaning so important that it is obviously head and shoulders above the rest would be fantastic. However, I have seen no convincing reasoning in my lifetime for a “higher” motivation or an unknown plan to life. I don’t see a reason for the idea that everything that happens will lead to some greater good, or that we ought to live for some greater thing than ourselves. Even if such a “higher” meaning existed, I fail to see how it would be obligatory. As I argued before, nothing can claim control over something it cannot control, and we believe ourselves to have something at least resembling free will. We have seen no evidence that outside forces can subtly and deliberately alter our choices and beliefs (yes, drugs, violence, and surgery can alter these things, but not in a finely controllable manner. We have seen no evidence of true mind control). If we are the only ones in control of our minds, than nothing else can claim to have control over it, forcing us to have to do things even if they are against our own interests. But, if I am wrong, and we do not truly have free will—some greater power is instead able to control us and force us to follow moral paths—then we needn’t worry either, because we will have to do the “right” thing. If these “greater” schemes exist, they require the control of people to ends other than their own. If we are truly pawns in this way, we can do nothing about it, and if we are not, we may pursue our own ends. Either way, there is nothing we ought to do; we owe these imagined greater and higher beings and structures nothing within our control.
Oughtlessness also has historical philosophical support. David Hume posited in his 1739 work A Treatise of Human Nature that one cannot necessarily infer ought statements from is statements, that is, statements about how we should act do not intuitively follow from statements about the state of the world. Hume leaves it open to question whether this gap can be filled, but asserts nevertheless in his initial statement of the problem “that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.” Other philosophers have followed in Hume’s trail. Rand, as I have mentioned before, starts her morality merely with the axiom that “existence exists,” and goes on to erect a morality in which people ought only to act for themselves, not for any “higher” interests. To be fair, however, as wikipedia’s page on meta-ethics shows, respected people have held and tried to defend virtually every possible view on the existence and nature of morality. Appealing to these philosophers may help my view seem more reasonable, but it would be ludicrous to make this appeal without also making it clear that the vast majority of philosophers would disagree with myself and each other on the specific nature of morality. Because of this inconsistency, I have focused much more on working within my own definitions to create a cogent, self-consistent view of what we ought to do rather than trying to support my view with others’ conclusions.
With this in mind, I turn finally to a more positive view of this argument. Oughtlessness shouldn’t necessarily be scary, impractical, or offensive. I have found it liberating. Over the next month, I will be posting about the nature of identity and the implications these ideas carry for how we organize our lives and societies. But for now, I will leave you with this. You owe nothing to anyone or anything. You may live oughtlessly. You have the freedom to choose your own path in life, bending and molding it as you please. No one else has this power, and with it comes your responsibility for your choices. This responsibility can no longer be couched in the moral claims of others; you may not hide behind the idea that you were obligated to do what you did. You have both the freedom and responsibility to decide on your own path, your own values, your own morality. You may not be capable of everything, but neither can you be preemptively restricted from doing anything because of the imagined burden of your own existence. We, who have lived in these chains for millennia, may throw off the shackles of duty and live for ourselves. This is the freedom of oughtlessness.
chris mcelroy 
And so the trodden flame returns, desperate to declare the world free. Yet flames do naught but destroy.
You aim to tear down the concept of “ought”. This is always a bad sign; no one benefits with fewer words to use—why make it harder to communicate? You have no good reason.
It is clear that you understand the frailty of your argument because you disguise two arguments as five. The first is that you didn’t exist when you were created, so you can’t owe anyone for your creation. This is immediately an entirely semantical argument. You fail to argue for it except to posit that it’s true and then draw a comparison with an engineer, all the while glancing over fundamental problems with the idea. How can one owe nothing and no one for the lifelong gift of one of the most fantastically complicated machines we know of? Since creation is a process and not an instant, how do you not emerge from the womb in debt to your mother, at the very least, for the nutrients you have been given throughout your creation? Further, how does this explain our lack of debt for every gift we receive throughout our lives (a point you bring up and quickly dismiss)? We are created by a system that works unimaginably hard for our existence to be as it is—how can we owe it nothing in return?
To provide a more thorough answer to these gaps, you lean heavily into your only remaining argument: that free will is an illusion so morality can’t exist. How can you bear to even say this, to directly contradict not only your previous arguments about the necessity of free will in a deterministic universe, but also your description of morality? And it implies an even deeper misunderstanding of the nature of morality: morality is inherently not that which is necessary (as you treat it here), it is that which we have a choice over. Moral decisions must be choices, choices which have a right and wrong answer. They are not some mystic power making decisions for you, they are the choices you and you alone have control over that nevertheless impact others for good or for bad. It is the fact that no one has control over you that necessitates our need to ought to do things, for otherwise the world would instantly become an unruly mess. If there is no right and wrong, why should anyone work for anything besides their own gain?
I worry that you will respond to this by arguing that there is a difference between “ought” and “should”, or that moral decisions do not fall into the category of “ought” for exactly the reasons I have given, and should be considered separately. This is precisely what I initially tried to caution you from. Morality is exactly the implication when people use “ought” today, so by making this argument you both misunderstand the meaning of the word and attempt to censor people from using “ought” how it ought to be used. It is infeasible and counterproductive to deliberately change the definitions of words. People change their ideas not from using different language to express themselves, but by expressing new thoughts with the same language. Please, do not go down this path.
You try to wrap up your arguments with an appeal to authority that is so poor even you admit it’s unconvincing and weak. Need I say more?
You finally conclude with a “positive” spin on your idea. You imagine a world where people are free to define morality however they please, beholden to no one and nothing. This is a world of anarchy and destruction, fitting for a t0rch, but not for civilization. It is not a world of freedom. To build such a world, we must come together with dignity, respect, and duty to uphold and improve the system we are a part of. We must continue to try to do the right thing, not for our own gain, but for the well being of those around us. We ought to do this, if we are to to be truly free.
Let this t0rch fade; it leads only the mobs to destruction.
Let me be clear. I advocate not for destruction. I argue for reason and responsibility.
Before I defend myself against your claims, your arguments have made it clear to me that I must be more clear about what I am attempting to get across. Again then, what is oughtlessness?
Oughtlessness is the idea that motivation is exclusively internal. There is no cosmic source of Right and Wrong, no arbitrator of your every action. One should not feel as though they are doing things because they have to or must do them, as decided by some exterior force. It is these thoughts of fundamentally external control or debt that oughtlessness seeks to destroy.
Oughtlessness is not an argument against morality. It is not an argument against free will. It does not mean you should never be motivated to do things, even to do things for other things or people. No one should feel unmotivated by oughtlessness, or undirected. Quite the opposite. It should free one to follow their own desires.
Oughtlessness is the assertion that if you ask “why” enough times about your actions, the deepest motivation must be yourself. No external force has the final say in your desires, wills, and actions. Your own self should be the reason that you act, at the most fundamental level—indeed, it can be no other way.
This has very real implications; if you are the one in control, you are responsible for what it is that you do and why it is that you do it. With this responsibility in mind, one should be deliberate about what it is you want to do and why, for reasons I will be writing more about in the coming weeks.
With this in mind, I feel that I can start to address the specific concerns you brought up against oughtlessness. First and foremost, this is not just a semantic concern. I am not trying to remove “ought” (the word) from existence. I seek to change people’s motivation. And I am willing to use ought, should, and must interchangeably (as I’ve used them in this response). What I take issue with is the implied antecedent. When I say “I must be more clear,” there is an implied “in order to get my point across,” not “because it’s the Right thing to do.” This is the difference I am concerned with.
Next, existence cannot be a debt, fundamentally. This, too, is not merely semantic. From your own perspective, conception is a miracle. You had no place in beginning your existence, did not work to earn it, or bargain for it. Yes, you can portray it as a gift. But it is a gift that can demand no response; it is a gift given with no intended recipient until it has been granted. This is a donation, not a bargain. You have been given life, yes, but you cannot owe anyone for it.
You are right that I did not fully explore the concept of debts earned during life. This is where I should be more distinct about the line I am attempting to draw. One can feel as if they owe people, or owe systems. One can feel obligated to fulfill promises and duties. I am only saying that these cannot be fundamentally external obligations—the cosmos, the fabric of existence, has no domain over these obligations. It is not “Right” to pay back these dues because someone else says it is, or someone else claimed God told them that it was. One can feel that it is moral to pay back debts, but this moral responsibility cannot flow from the decrees of others. These debts are your own, the responsibility of the parties involved in the exchange, and no otherworldly all-powerful forces that somehow have the final authority on Right and Wrong. This is what I mean when I say, “The outside world simply doesn’t have a say in these transactions.” Oughtlessness should not void you of responsibility, it puts all of the responsibility on your self.
Looking at life from the other perspective, this view is only reinforced. This is the thinking behind my free will argument. Look at your self from an external perspective. I am not trying to argue that free will doesn’t exist, quite the opposite—I am using the fact that your will is your own to drive home my point. If no external force can lie claim to your will, it cannot claim to cause or necessitate your actions. If free will exists, it destroys any such hold an external entity could claim over your actions. The fundamental reason you do things cannot be for reasons other than your own, because there is nothing and no one else causing them. Thus, the sentence, “I want to do X, but I have to do Y” makes no philosophical sense (though, yes, it’s still a handy way to talk). If you have to do Y, you either want to do it for some reason of your own, or you do not have control over your self. Those are the only two fundamental options, and I am asserting that free will precludes the possibility of the latter. Thus oughtlessness is our only remaining option.
I agree with you that moral choices “are not some mystic power making decisions for you, they are the choices you and you alone have control over that nevertheless impact others for good or for bad.” However, I want it to be clear to all that this “good” and “bad” is decided by the person. It is not up to the universe to decide these designations for you, for some all-knowing but powerless entity is still powerless to influence this decision for you. Moral Rights are not self apparent. And if life is truly a means to a greater end, whoever chose that greater end must either control you to this end or hope you agree with the means. Either way, in the end, you decide what is “good” and “bad” to you.
My appeal to authority is not an attempt to convince anyone of my validity—I hope my arguments do that on their own—but an attempt to make them more palatable. I know that declarations like “moral Rights are not self apparent” can be uncomfortable for people, so I’m attempting to relate them back to potentially less uncomfortable ideologies, to make them more obviously relatable. These appeals were never intended to have argumentative merit.
Finally: I agree with you! We must come together with dignity, respect, and duty, if we want to build a free world. But notice! The antecedent there is not “because it’s the Right thing to do” or “because all people are owed dignity and respect,” it’s “in order to build a more perfect world.” This is exactly the type of conclusion that oughtlessness allows for. If you want to do something, create a system that ensures that it will happen. If your system fails to do what you want, change it! It wasn’t right! But the right is decided by the different between your intentions and your effects, not the differences between your actions and some predetermined set of correct actions. This is a system of motivation and action that can always answer why it did something. Oughtlessness means taking ownership of the world and your influence over it. It means knowing why you do what you do. And it can give you a peace of mind unavailable to those hoping that their rules were right, hoping that they’ll be rewarded for their morality by a cosmos that cares naught for them. Oughtlessness is a new, better way to live, one that I want to share with all of you.